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PROBLEMS IN THE USE OF OUTCOME
STATISTICS TO COMPARE HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS
Jesse Green*
INTRODUCTION
Until just a few years ago, disclosure of the names of hospi-
tals or physicians along with their patients' death rates would
have been considered indiscreet. In 1986 the Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration ("HCFA") made the first public release
of such a list, but only after the New York Times obtained the
data on appeal under the federal Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA).
While initially reticent, HCFA and others in possession of
such data have subsequently adapted to the new openness. Since
1987 HCFA has held annual news conferences to release mortal-
ity rates of all United States hospitals treating Medicare pa-
tients. Press kits distributed at these sessions include the widely
publicized "death list" of high mortality outlier hospitals. This
ranking is instantly transmitted by wire services to television
newsrooms and newspapers throughout the country. The follow-
ing headlines appearing on May 2, 1991 indicate the range of
coverage: "161 Hospitals Found With High Death Rates"; 2
"Seven Hospitals in Pennsylvania Cited for Deaths";3 and
"City's 'Killer' Hospitals Listed. '"
Since HCFA's initial public release of this information, in-
terest in the use of comparative outcome statistics to evaluate
health care providers has mushroomed. HCFA's efforts spurred
* Ph.D. and Director of the Department of Health Policy Research, New York Uni-
versity Medical Center/NYU School of Medicine.
1 Joel Brinkley, U.S. Releasing Lists of Hospitals With Abnormal Mortality Rates,
N.Y. Trmhs, March 12, 1986, at Al.
2 161 Hospitals Found with High Death Rates, N.Y. TIMs, May 2, 1991, at Bll.
3Seven Hospitals in Pennsylvania Cited for Deaths, LNcAsmm Naws, May 2,
1991, at 4.
" Penny Bender, City's "Killer" Hospitals Listed, N.Y. DAiLY NEWS, May 2, 1991, at
2.
, Arnold M. Epstein, M.D., M.A., The Outcomes Movement-Will It Get Us Where
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a major research initiative focused on effectiveness of cares and
inspired similar analyses by states,7 private payers, 8 providers"
and hospital associations.10 Minnesota's Blue Cross and Blue
Shield has carried the approach beyond merely issuing reports.
It now adjusts hospital reimbursement rates depending on sta-
tistically measured outcomes to financially reward or punish
hospitals for their "performance."' 1 New York State broke new
ground by publishing post-surgical patient mortality rates for all
its cardiac surgeons.12
This important trend of releasing performance outcomes of
doctors and hospitals raises the controversial issue of whether
the results of such studies, insofar as they purport to provide
information useful for consumers, should be believed. It seemed
timely, therefore, to examine the scientific basis upon which
such studies rest and to discuss some of the concerns about their
validity. Evaluation of the information contained in lists of pro-
vider-specific outcome indicators involves two central issues.
First is the problem of "bias," that is, the fact that the outcomes
being compared reflect not only the care provided but the condi-
tion of the patients each provider served. Second is the issue of
random variation, particularly the so-called problem of "multi-
We Want To Go?, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 266 (1990); Steven F. Jencks, M.D., M.P.H,
Quality Assurance, 263 JAMA 2679 (1990).
a Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2228
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Arnold S. Relman, M.D., As-
sessment and Accountability, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1220 (1988); William L. Roper,
M.D. et al., Effectiveness in Health Care, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1197 (1988); AHCPR
Program Note, Medical Treatment Effectiveness Research, U.S. Dept. of Health and
Human Services, Rockville, MD, March 1990.
7 PA. HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT COUNCIL., HOSPITAL EFFECTIVENESS REPORT,
Pub. No. HE6-1-89, (1989); Edward L. Hannan, Ph.D. et al., Adult Open Heart Surgery
in New York State, 264 JAMA 2768 (1990).
a Purchasers will use outcome data to select quality hospitals. Hospital Peer Review
§ 14, at 124-26 (1989).
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNING OFFICE, VA HOSPITAL CARE. A COMPARISON OF VA AND
HCFA METHODS FOR ANALYZING PATIENT OuTcoMEs, GAO/PEMD-88-29, Washington,
DC, June, 1988.
10 Quality Measurement and Management Project, The Hospital and Research Edu-
cational Trust, Risk-adjusted 30-day Mortality of Fresh Acute Myocardial Infarctions:
The User's Guide 1989, Maryland Hospital Association, Hospital Mortality Data Anal-
ysis October 1989 (1989).
11 M. Darby, Minnesota Blues Re-allocates Resources Using Outcomes Research
(1992).
12 David Zinman, State Takes Docs' List to Heart, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Dec. 18, 1991, at
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ple comparisons," that is, the fact that statistical theory predicts
that when many similar providers are compared, even if no dif-
ferences exist, some will be "outliers" by chance alone.
These problems are not exclusively the result of any specific
shortcomings of particular studies but are to be expected from
any study that attempts to compare outcomes of many providers
on the basis of events that occurred outside of a controlled ex-
periment. However, in addition to the intrinsic limitations that
apply to all such studies, specific features of each outcome
study, including the reliability and validity of measured risk fac-
tors and analytic techniques employed, also require evaluation
in understanding the findings such efforts yield.
I. THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF COMPARATIVE OUTCOME STATISTICS
A list of hospital or physician-specific mortality rates, ad-
justed for patient risk, may be viewed by consumers of health
services as a basis for comparing the effectiveness of care availa-
ble from different providers. In assessing the credibility of such
data for this purpose, it is useful to consider the more general
problem of how medical researchers compare alternative treat-
ments to determine their relative efficacy. What constitutes
credible evidence that one therapy-e.g. a drug or surgical inter-
vention-yields better results than another? Under many cir-
cumstances the ideal method for generating such evidence is the
randomized clinical trial."3 Generally, in clinical trials groups of
patients receive alternative therapies, or one group gets a spe-
cific therapy while the other receives a placebo.
An important methodological feature of a randomized
clinical trial is that patients are assigned to a group by random
selection. Because random assignment is used, any difference in
outcomes between groups can come from two sources only: sam-
pling variability and the alternative treatments themselves. The
great advantage of this study design is that when randomization
is used to assign patients to treatments, the probability that dif-
ferent outcomes are due to sampling variation can be deter-
mined precisely using statistical sampling theory. Hence,
randomization assures that it is possible to know how confident
13 David P. Byar, The Necessity and Justification of Randomized Clinical Trials,
in CONTROVERSIES IN CANCER (HJ Tagnon, M.D. & M.J. Staquet, ALD. eds., 1979).
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one may be that observed differences in outcomes are attributa-
ble to the treatments being compared.
II. LIMITATIONS OF NON-RANDOMIZED STUDIES
When patients are assigned non-randomly to different treat-
ments, inferences about the relationship of treatments to out-
comes are weakened. When comparing groups that are not ran-
dom samples of a population, there may be many reasons that
could account for observed differences in outcomes, other than
alternative treatments. For example, patients given treatment A
may have been more seriously ill than those given treatment B.
In some situations, the fact that they were more ill may be the
reason for prescribing A. 4 If treatment A is thought to be a
safer choice in high risk cases, then its use in such cases will be
more likely to make the treatment look less safe or less effective
than treatment B because high risk cases have higher mortality
rates.'5 In other words, considerations of patients' clinical condi-
tions greatly influence treatment choices in practice and are
strong potential sources of bias in comparisons of their effects.
Overcoming such biases in non-randomized studies is gener-
ally attempted through statistical adjustment. Such adjustment
techniques seek to measure and control for the effect of differ-
ences between treatment groups, such as age, gender, diagnosis,
comorbid conditions and measures of physiologic functioning.
This analytic procedure is employed in an effort to simulate
mathematically the experimental situation by estimating how
different groups would compare if patient characteristics were
identical. Unfortunately, while statistical adjustment may re-
duce bias, it cannot yield that which randomization provides: a
quantifiable degree of certainty that the groups are equivalent.
Theoretically, it is possible to conduct a randomized trial of
several different health care providers, such as two or more heart
surgeons or hospitals. However, such studies are rarely under-
taken because of political issues, e.g., patients would be required
to accept random assignments and to give up their ability to
choose their own surgeons. Instead, observational databases of
14 Sylvia B. Green & David P. Byar, Using Observational Data from Registries to
Compare Treatments, 3 STAT. IN MED. 361, 362 (1984).
1" Nathan Mantel, Cautions on the Use of Medical Databases, 2 STAT. IN ME.). 355
(1983).
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health care episodes are generally employed in the studies that
compare providers, such as hospital discharge abstracts, possibly
supplemented with additional clinical data.
III. THE ROLE OF CHANCE IN IDENTIFYING OUTLIERs: THE PROB-
LEM OF MULTIPLE COMPARISONS
Some reports flag providers as "outliers" if their mortality
rates are more than two standard deviations higher than pre-
dicted. For example, HCFA's report flags hospitals in this man-
ner. This approach treats the question of whether a hospital's
mortality rate is greater than predicted as a hypothesis test with
a p < .05 level of confidence. When many hypothesis tests are
conducted in this manner, the problem of multiple inferences
arises.16 As Frederick A. Connell explains, "if the level of signifi-
cance is set at p < .05, 5% of all relationships will be statisti-
cally significant by chance alone.117 This kind of consideration
led D.C. Thomas to caution that "[a]ny study which collects in-
formation on a large number of 'stimulus' and 'response' vari-
ables has a high probability of producing wild goose chases
which can consume much valuable research time and resources
to refute."'1 8
Published reports that present outcome statistics may ex-
amine hundreds or thousands of providers, treating each specific
provider as a study variable or "risk factor." When considering
such lists it is important to note that even under the "null hy-
pothesis"-a scenario in which the providers' performances do
not differ at all-5% of providers would be expected to be
falsely identified as either high or low "outliers" by a two stan-
dard deviation test. In a 1990 report examining data from 5,685
hospitals, HCFA designated 161, or 2.8%, as high mortality out-
liers. 9 By chance alone one would expect 2.5% of observations,
or 142 hospitals, to lie more than two standard deviations above
(and a similar number below) the prediction.
16 D.C. Thomas et aL, The Problem of Multiple Inference in Studies Designed to
Generate Hypotheses, 122 Ah. J. EPMEMIOLOGY 1080 (1985).
17 Frederick A. Connell, The Use of Large Data Bases in Health Care Studies, 1987
ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 62.
18 Thomas, supra note 16, at 1081.
,9 161 Hospitals Found With High Death Rates, N.Y. Tams, May 2, 1991, at Bll.
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IV. HCFA's MEDICARE MORTALITY REPORT: A RESEARCH
SUMMARY
Death rates among hospitalized Medicare patients at more
than 5,000 hospitals have been analyzed by HCFA in its annual
series Medicare Hospital Mortality Information.20 In each re-
port, hospitals with observed mortality rates significantly ex-
ceeding HCFA's predictions have been flagged as high-mortality
outlier hospitals. HCFA's analyses take account of some charac-
teristics of each hospital's patients through a multiple regression
model that determines each patient's risk of death as calculated
from information contained in Medicare claims records.
To date four published studies have assessed the methodol-
ogy used in HCFA's mortality report.21 All four studies indicate
that biases were operating in the designation of hospital mortal-
ity outliers. In one study, data on the severity of each patient's
illness measured on a scale of one to four were used to supple-
ment the basic demographic and diagnostic data employed by
HCFA.2 The study demonstrated that severity of illness was the
explanation for most of the gap between actual and predicted
mortality rates in a sample of 34,552 patients with 5 diagnoses
at 13 hospitals. When the different severity levels were consid-
ered, there were distinct subgroups of patients whose risks of
death at the time of admission were significantly different. Ac-
tual mortality rates among patients in the "cancer" diagnostic
category, for example, varied from less than 1% at the lowest
severity level to 86% at the highest. Using a method similar to
that of HCFA to predict the mortality rates of these patients,
the study found that the prediction model was unable to detect
20 OTIS R. BOWEN, M.D. & WILLmi L. ROPER, M.D., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, IV MEDICARE HOSPITAL MORTALITY INFORMATION (1986); OTIS R. BOWEN, M.D.
& WILLIAM L. ROPER, M.D., U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, MEDICARE Hospi-
TAL MORTALITY INFORMATION, REGION II (1987); Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D. & Louis B.
HAYS, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 5 MEDICARE HOSPITAL MORTALITY IN-
FORMATION (1986-88).
' Jesse Green, Ph.D. et al., Analyzing Hospital Mortality: The Consequences of
Diversity in Patient Mix, 265 JAMA 1849 (1991) [hereinafter Hospital Mortality]; Jesse
Green, Ph.D. et al., The Importance of Severity of Illness in Assessing Hospital Mortal-
ity, 263 JAMA 241 (1990) [hereinafter Severity of Illness]; David A. Schwartz, M.D.,
M.P.H. and Philip Reilly, J.D., M.D., The Choice Not to be Resuscitated, J. AM. GERIAT-
RICS Soc'v, Nov. 1986, at 807; David W. Smith, Ph.D. et al., Using Clinical Variables to
Estimate the Risk of Patient Mortality, 29 MED. CARE 1108 (1991).
22 Green, Severity of Illness, supra note 21, at 241.
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the differences in severity of illness. In each diagnostic category
it predicted mortality rates that did not significantly differ
across the severity levels.
David W. Smith and his colleagues compared HCFA's pre-
diction model with a model developed from data that included
detailed clinical findings concerning each patient.23 The authors
noted that "the HCFA methods were found to be biased in iden-
tifying outlier hospitals" and concluded that some of the bias
could be removed if additional clinical data were used to supple-
ment HCFA data.24
A RAND Corporation report found that "high mortality
outlier" hospitals had as good or better quality of care than non-
outlier hospitals and that the higher than predicted mortality
rates at the outlier hospitals were due to severity of illness, "do
not resuscitate" status and chance variation .2
Finally, Jesse Green and his colleagues examined data from
5,560 hospitals and found that patient characteristics among
Medicare populations served by different hospitals varied widely
and that these differences influenced the mortality results.28
Even though the HCFA model controls for age, hospitals with
the oldest patients were twice as likely to be flagged as mortality
outliers as hospitals with the smallest proportion of very elderly
patients. An increased percentage of patients requiring nursing
home care also resulted in a greater chance of being designated
as an outlier hospital.
HCFA has acknowledged that its list of "high mortality out-
lier hospitals" includes some institutions that provide quality
care but have high mortality rates because the patients they
serve are severely rn. 27 HCFA estimates that such errors account
for one-third of listed hospitals.28 However, the study by Green
and his colleagues indicated that the figure may be as high as
46%.29
Smith, supra note 21, at 1110.
24 Id. at 1116-19.
2.Rolla E. Park, Ph.D, MB.A. et aL, Explaining Variations in Hospital Death
Rates: Randomness, Severity of Illness, Quality of Care, 264 JAMA 484 (1990).
28 Hospital Mortality, supra note 21.
David Zinman, Hospitals' Deaths at Expected Levels, Nnwso%'A, May 2, 1991, at
19.
28 Id.
29 Hospital Mortality, supra note 21, at 1852.
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V. THE FALLACY OF INTERPRETING UNEXPLAINED DIFFERENCES AS
EFFECTIVENESS
Biases in published mortality statistics are not surprising
given the inherent limitations of observational databases for ad-
dressing outcome differences. As noted above, similar problems
arise when observational databases are used to study treatment
efficacy. For example, David P. Byar analyzed thyroid tumor
registry data and found that prognostic factors, such as age, sex,
histology of tumor, size and location of tumor and extent of me-
tastases, were associated with enormous variation in patients'
survival duration. Byar concluded that such data could generate
misleading results because ". . . any differences in survival at-
tributable to different therapies are likely to be much smaller
than those attributed to prognostic factors. '3 0
By the same token, given the substantial variation among
providers in terms of the characteristics of patients served and
the impact of these characteristics on mortality, the difficulty of
detecting any differences that are genuinely due to "quality of
care" or effectiveness is problematic. Compounding this problem
is that while clinical characteristics of patients have a very large
effect on mortality rates, the effect on quality may be quite
small. For example, a peer review organization chart audit of
275,274 randomly selected Medicare hospitalizations turned up
less than 0.5% involving an avoidable death.-" Rolla E. Park and
her colleagues reported that marked differences in quality of
care provided to patients with congestive heart failure were asso-
ciated with a 1.5% gradient in 30-day mortality.3'
With each improvement in data or technique there is a
temptation to label whatever variation not yet accounted for as
"quality of care" or "effectiveness." However, detecting small
differences in death rates that would be expected to result from
variations in effectiveness may be beyond the power of existing
methods. In 1989 HCFA flagged 182 hospitals as high outliers
based on patients admitted in 1986. No hospital was flagged un-
less its actual mortality rate was at least 3.1% above HCFA's
prediction and the majority of flagged hospitals had mortality
'o Byar, supra note 13, at 76.
Prospective Payment Assessment Commission, Medicare Prospective Payment
and the American Health Care System, Report to Congress, June 1988.
"2 Park, supra note 25, at 487.
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rates at least 6% greater than expected.33 Allowing such wide
margins means, for example, that a hospital with 1,000 cases and
an expected mortality rate of 12%, or 120 deaths, would avoid
"outlier" designation if its mortality rate was 15%, or 150
deaths, and would probably not be flagged unless its mortality
rate rose to 18%, or 180 deaths. "Excess" deaths of such magni-
tude could be accounted for if a hospital provided care to many
severely ill patients with "do not resuscitate orders" on admis-
sion.34 However, the view that it could be due to quality of care
requires a much higher prevalence of unnecessary or preventable
deaths in hospitals than has been reported. This illustrates why
the belief that very large differences in mortality rates are likely
to be due to quality may be fallacious.
A. Severity of Illness
The need to measure and control for disease severity is ac-
centuated when patients with the same diagnosis may have dif-
ferent prognoses depending on their degree of illness. A variety
of techniques have been developed for estimating the severity of
a patient's illness. Some rely solely on hospital discharge data.
For example, HCFA's method used for the annual mortality re-
port projects a prognosis for each patient expressed as the a pri-
ori probability that despite treatment, the patient would die
within each of three fixed time periods-30, 90 and 180 days of
admission. These probabilities are calculated from claims data
using listed diagnoses, age and sex of the patient, and severity
proxies, that is, whether the patient came from home, a nursing
home, or elsewhere and whether the "type" of admission was
"elective," "urgent" or "emergent."
Other approaches to measuring severity require a much
broader array of clinical findings than are available on claims
data. For example, MedisGroups, a proprietary computerized
system, generates severity of illness scores ranging from one
(least severe) to four (most severe) by applying an algorithm to
the results of physiologic measures.3 There are a number of
"Jesse Green, Ph.D. et al., Hospital Mortality Reports 12 (July 31, 1990) (final
report to the AARP Andrus Found. on file with the author).
I Park, supra note 25, at 487.
"Lisa L Iezzoni, M.D. et al., Admission and Mid-Stay MedisGroups Scores as
Predictors of Death Within 30 Days of Hospital Admission, 81 Ai.- J. Ptm. Hni 74,
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published reviews of the available severity measurement sys-
tems.3 6 In general, the literature supports the view that explicit
severity measures add considerably to the predictive capability
of mortality prediction models.3 7 Nonetheless, biased assess-
ments may still result from flaws in the measurement of severity
by some of these instruments.3"
One purpose of the hospital mortality listings is to indicate
the effectiveness of caregiver performance to consumers. In this
context, severity of illness measures are used to separate two
components of the mortality rate: (1) the degree to which the
patient's present condition contributed to the probability of
death, and (2) the contribution of the specific care provider.
While statistical adjustment cannot be expected to disaggregate
thoroughly these two effects, inadequate adjustment leads to
mortality statistics that are completely uninterpretable.
Much of the debate surrounding the release of provider-spe-
cific mortality data focuses on the adequacy of the statistical ad-
justment for severity of illness. Because much of this debate can
be rather arcane, its importance may be lost in situations where
conflicting interests compete, such as in litigation. Accordingly,
it would be helpful to have an agreed upon set of criteria that
could be used to evaluate the various techniques used to mea-
sure and adjust for severity of illness. While some criteria, such
as measures of predictive validity, are commonly cited, there is
no broad consensus either on which measure is most appropri-
ate, or what level of predictive validity is adequate for a given
purpose.
One measure that is frequently used to indicate the predic-
tive power of a severity measure when used to project mortality
74-75 (1991).
" Farrokh Alemi, Ph.D. et al., Predicting In-Hospital Survival of Myocardial In-
farction, 28 MED. CARE 762 (1990); David Aquilina et al., Using Severity Data to Mea-
sure Quality, Bus. & HEALTH, June 1988, at 40; Lisa I. Iezzoni, M.D. et al., Predicting In-
Hospital Mortality, 30 MED. CARE 347 (1992) [hereinafter In-Hospital Mortality]; Lisa I.
Iezzoni, M.D., M.S., Using Severity Information For Quality Assessment, Dec. 1989
QuAL. REv. BULL. 376; J. William Thomas & Marie L. F. Ashcraft, Measuring Severity of
Illness, 26 INQUiRY 483 (1989).
37 Severity of Illness, supra note 21, at 245; Smith, supra note 21, at 1116-17; In-
Hospital Mortality, supra note 36.
38 Mark S. Blumberg, M.D., Biased Estimates of Expected Acute Myocardial In-
farction Mortality using MedisGroups Admission Severity Groups, 265 JAMA 2965
(1991); Smith, supra note 21, at 1118-19.
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is R2, a statistic that summarizes the degree of "fit" of a regres-
sion model. R2 ranges from 0% to 100%. Green and his col-
leagues reported that R2 values for a simulated HCFA-type
model averaged 2.5% across five diagnostic categories29 The
same study found that adding an explicit measurement of sever-
ity, the Severity of Illness Index, increased the R2 to 21.5%."o
Jennifer Daley and her colleagues compared models incorporat-
ing two such instruments-the Medicare Mortality Predictor
System and APACHE H-and reported R2 values for stroke pa-
tients of 25.3% and 22.0% respectively."1 Lisa I. Iezzoni has also
reported good predictive capacity with a model using
MedisGroups.42
While these preliminary comparisons cannot be considered
benchmarks, since they came from different studies and used
different criteria for sampling patients, certain patterns emerge.
It is clear that the R 2 statistics for the simulated HCFA model,
derived exclusively from hospital claims data, are quite small.
By contrast, predictions based on any of the well known severity
of illness systems are, in general, about an order of magnitude
larger. Additionally, even the severity adjusted measures have
R 2 statistics that are generally in the 15%-25% range, implying
that most of the variation in mortality rates remain unexplained
even by the best available measures.
B. Data Accuracy
When interpreting the fact that a particular providers' mor-
tality rate is much higher than predicted, the possibility that the
result may be due to data errors should always be considered.
Experienced data analysts know that when an "outlier" appears
in a set of data, the first thing to check for is a possible record-
ing error.43 Some of the health care databases that are used to
generate published mortality statistics contain many inaccura-
" Severity of Illness, supra note 21, at 243.
40 Susan D. Horn, Ph.D. et al., Measuring Severity of Illness, 21 Ama. CAE 14
(1983).
41 Jennifer Daley, M.D. et al., Predicting Hospital-Associated Mortality for Medi-
care Patients, 260 JAMA 3617 (1988).
42 Lisa L Iezzoni, M.D., M.S. et al., The Ability of MedisGroups and Clinical Vari-
ables to Predict Cost and In-Hospital Deaths at 143.46 (July 1, 1988) (research report,
on file with the author).
43 F.J. Anscombe, Rejection of Outliers, 2 TacuNo~warmcs 123 (1960).
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cies. The literature reports error rates for patients' principal di-
agnoses ranging from 18.5%, 4 to 42.8%,"1 and about 26% for
secondary diagnoses (comorbidities). 4' Doubts have been ex-
pressed about the coding accuracy of two other data elements
used as mortality risk adjusters: "transfer source" and "type of
admission. '47 Moreover, research indicates that such error rates
are not uniform across hospitals. 8
C. Which Results are Right?
Different clinical studies comparing treatments sometimes
reach opposite conclusions because of subtle methodological dif-
ferences. For example, several published studies using claims
databases indicated that mortality rates following transurethral
resection of the prostate (TURP) exceeded the rates following a
different procedure, open prostatectomy.49 These results sur-
prised urologists since TURP was considered the safer proce-
dure than open prostatectomy. Some urologists speculated that
the findings could be due to the fact that TURP is more fre-
quently performed on high-risk patients than open prostatec-
tomy.50 John Concato and his colleagues tested this hypothesis
by examining medical records of 252 men who underwent either
operation and found that, after controlling for the full extent of
patients' illnesses (comorbidities), the mortality rates for the
two procedures were indistinguishable. 5 1
Similarly, varying approaches to studying provider out-
comes often yield different results. Several studies have found
44 Richard F. Corn, The Sensitivity of Prospective Hospital Reimbursement to Er-
rors in Patient Data, 18 INQUIRY 351, 354 (1981).
4' Linda K. Demlo, Ph.D. et al., Reliability of Information Abstracted from Pa-
tients' Medical Records, 16 MED. CARE 995, 998 (1978).
41 Id. at 999; Allan N. Johnson & Gary L. Appel, DRGs and Hospital Case Records,
21 INQUIRY 128, 133 (1984).
47 Elizabeth Gardner, UB-82 Forms Offer Wealth of Information, Misinformation,
MoD. HEALTHCARE, Sept. 24, 1990, at 18, 24.
" Susan S. Lloyd, R.R.A. & J. Peter Rissing, M.D., Physician and Coding Errors in
Patient Records, 254 JAMA 1330, 1333 (1985); Naomi S. Soderstrom, Are Reporting
Errors Under PPS Random or Systematic?, 27 INQUIRY 234 (1990).
"' Noralon P. Roos & Ernest W. Ramsey, A Population-Based Study of Prostatec-
tomy, 137 J. UROLOGY 1184, 1187 (1987); John E. Wennberg et al., Use of Claims Data
Systems to Evaluate Health Care Outcomes, 257 JAMA 933, 935 (1987).
50 John Concato, M.D., M.S., M.P.H. et al., Problems of Comorbidity in Mortality
after Prostatectomy, 267 JAMA 1077, 1080-81 (1992).
81 Id.
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that when lists of hospital mortality outliers generated from
databases are examined further using severity of illness adjust-
ments, the lists change. In some studies many of the "outliers"
flagged by a method like that of HCFA ceased to be outliers
when severity of illness was incorporated. 2 Edward L. Hannan,
the developer of the Cardiac Surgery Reporting System
("CSRS") used in New York State, found that claims data alone
generated a different set of cardiac surgery mortality outlier hos-
pitals than a more detailed database that included clinical risk
factors.53
Even when the same database is used, various ways of speci-
fying the statistical model can yield markedly different lists of
outliers. For example, Green and his colleagues compared the
lists of outlier hospitals generated for hospital admissions in
1986 in two of HCFA's annual mortality reports. The compari-
son revealed that HCFA's methodological changes between the
1987 and 1989 mortality reports gave rise to new assessments of
the outlier status of individual hospitals, even when the same
hospitalizations were studied. Of the 126 hospitals designated as
high mortality outliers in 1986, according to HCFA's 1987 re-
port, 53, or 42%, were no longer considered to have been outliers
for the year 1986 in the 1989 report." Such modification of im-
portant study results as methods change may either indicate
progress or suggest that the findings are too sensitive to method-
ological details.
VI. NEW YORK STATE'S CARDIAC SURGERY MORTALITY REPORT
An ongoing study by the New York State Department of
Health is evaluating inpatient hospital mortality rates following
open heart surgery.55 The project relies on a database, CSRS,
containing data on patients' risk factors for post-surgical mortal-
ity and their in-hospital survival outcomes. Among the
databases currently used to compare providers, the CSRS study
probably represents the best design yet implemented. Therefore,
512 Robert W. DuBois, M.D., Ph.D. et aL, Hospital Inpatient Mortality, 317 New
ENO. J. MED. 1674, 1676, 1678-79 (1987); Hospital Mortality, supra note 21; Severity of
Illness, supra note 21, at 245; Smith, supra note 21, at 1116-19.
Hannan, supra note 7, at 2773.
Green, supra note 33, at 11.
"Hannan, supra note 7, at 2773.
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as the leading example of this kind of research, the New York
State study merits careful evaluation.
The development and some applications of the CSRS have
been described elsewhere." Briefly, the database consists of
records of all adult open heart surgical discharges from New
York State hospitals since 1989. The form used to collect the
information, developed by a panel of surgeons and statisticians,
includes information on demographics, types of procedures and
clinical risk factors.
In comparison with HCFA's study, the New York cardiac
surgery investigation has some distinct advantages. First, while
HCFA has had to rely on a database designed for hospital billing
rather than risk assessment, the CSRS was designed specifically
for research on cardiac surgical mortality. Second, the New York
State study focuses on a more homogeneous patient popula-
tion-those undergoing cardiac surgery-than HCFA's study of
all Medicare patients hospitalized in the United States. Third,
hospital care involving an intensive therapeutic intervention like
open heart surgery would almost never occur during admissions
for terminal, hospice-type care, thus avoiding a major potential
confounding factor in HCFA's study. Finally, the severity of ill-
ness measure used in the CSRS is based on a broad array of
demographic and clinical factors associated with post-surgical
survival and this measure is supported by considerable scientific
evidence.
On the other hand, HCFA's study had the advantage of ac-
cess to dates of all Medicare beneficiary deaths independent of
the inpatient data and could therefore hold survival durations
constant for all patients at 30, 90 and 180 days. The New York
State database is strictly an inpatient record and is limited to
studying deaths that occurred in the hospital only.
There are also potential problems in the design of the CSRS
study. The group of cardiac patients studied in the CSRS is not
entirely homogeneous. For example, patients undergoing emer-
gency open heart surgery for "disasters," such as gunshot or
knife wounds, with a mortality rate of 43%, are included with
those having only bypass surgery, with a mortality rate of 4%. It
" Id.; Edward L. Hannan, Ph.D. et al., Coronary Artery Bypass Surgery, 29 MED.
CARE 1094 (1991); New York Department of Health, Cardiac Surgery Research Results
Encourage Improvements in Performance, EPIDEMIOLOGY NoTEs Feb. 1991.
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is unlikely that a single statistical model can accommodate
scheduled bypass surgery to relieve coronary artery disease and
cases of trauma from gunshots. Instead, "disasters" should prob-
ably be studied separately.
In addition, while the list of risk factors included in the
study conforms to those used in other research on cardiac sur-
gery, it was not exhaustive.57 According to the developers, cer-
tain risk factors, such as ventricular dysfunction and severity of
coronary arteriosclerosis, that are known to increase the risk of
post-surgical mortality were not incorporated into the CSRS be-
cause their inclusion would have been too difficult or expen-
sive.58 The first published study based upon the CSRS docu-
mented the construction of the databases, an evaluation of risk
factors and an estimation of a model to predict mortality.59 No
hospitals were identified in the article. However, a press release
issued by the New York State Department of Health coinciding
with the study's publication did identify the hospitals by name,
ranking them from one to thirty according to their risk-adjusted
mortality rates. This ranked list of New York State's surgical
centers appeared in the New York Times on December 5, 1990.0
While consumer groups applauded and hospital officials ex-
pressed concern about the release of the mortality rate rankings
of hospitals, issues regarding the scientific validity of the rank-
ings received little coverage. On the one hand, the scientific re-
port on the CSRS showed that a hospital's predicted mortality
rate could be precisely determined from the CSRS using a 95%
confidence interval, only to within plus or minus 2-3%.ol On the
other hand, the hospital rankings released by New York State
and published in a chart by the New York Times differed by as
little as .01%, a difference that is more than 100 times smaller
than the threshold of statistical significance. 2
"' Victor Parsonnet, M.D., F.A.C.C. et al, A Method of Uniform Stratification of
Risk for Evaluating the Results of Surgery in Acquired Adult Heart Disease, 79 Cmcu-
LATION 1-3 (1989).
1 Hannan, supra note 7, at 2772.
59 Id.
'0 Lawrence K. Altman, Heart-Surgery Death Rates Decline in New York, N.Y.
Thms, Dec. 5, 1990, at B10.
Hannan, supra note 7, at 2772.
Altman, supra note 60.
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VII. A NEW PRECEDENT: NAMING THE PHYSICIANS
On December 17, 1990 a New York Newsday reporter filed a
request with the New York State Department of Health under
New York's Freedom of Information Law for physician-specific
mortality data derived from the CSRS. The Health Department
denied the request initially and on administrative appeal. The
basis for denial was that disclosure of the physician names could
constitute a violation of the Personal Privacy Protection Law. 3
Newsday appealed to the New York State Supreme Court. An
affidavit from the Health Department opposing the appeal again
argued that release would invade physicians' privacy and that
the invasion would be unwarranted "because of the potential
that the data would be misunderstood and misused by the pub-
lic, resulting in significant adverse impact upon the physicians
identified by the data, with little public benefit. '64
While arguing that the public would misunderstand the
data, the Health Department simultaneously represented that
the data themselves were accurate. By representing the validity
of the data, while questioning the ability of consumers to under-
stand them, the Department left itself open to the following re-
tort by the court: "In other words, the State must protect its
citizens from their intellectual shortcomings by keeping from
them information beyond their ability to comprehend." 5 In
finding for Newsday, the court concluded that physicians had
little reason to expect that their surgical results would be kept
private and added that "even if there was a legitimate privacy
expectation, the interest of the public outweighs it." 6
Because the Health Department raised no question about
the validity of its data, the deliberations proceeded without dis-
cussion of the limitations of the physician comparisons. How-
ever, these limitations were apparently quite serious. The follow-
ing is an excerpt from a statement issued subsequently by the
Department:
'3 Letter from Peter Slocum, Records Appeals Officer, N.Y. State Dep't of Health,
to Nancy E. Richman, Senior Staff Counsel, NEWSDAY (Feb. 15, 1991) (on file with the
author).
"' Respondent's Affidavit in Opposition at 3, Newsday v. N.Y. State Dep't of
Health, 19 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1477 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (No. 3406-91).
e' Newsday, 19 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 1478.
6 Id. at 1479.
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To examine the stability of the data, the risk-adjusted patient
mortality rates of cardiac surgeons in 1989 and 1990 were compared to
determine how valuable 1989 information was in predicting 1990 per-
formance. The results of those comparisons demonstrate that the 1989
risk-adjusted mortality rates cannot be used to predict 1990 perform-
ance at a surgeon level. For example, of the 29 surgeons with risk-
adjusted mortality rates in the highest quartile in 1989, 9 (31%) had
risk-adjusted mortality rates that were in the lowest half in 1990, and
six (21%) had risk-adjusted rates in the lowest quartile in 1990. This
analysis is based on the 118 cardiac surgeons performing coronary ar-
tery bypass graft operations in New York State in both 1989 and
1990.
Of the 30 surgeons with risk-adjusted rates in the lowest quartile
in 1989, twelve (40%) had risk-adjusted rates in the upper half in
1990, and three (10%) had risk-adjusted rates in the highest quartile.
Overall, the correlation coefficient (Pearson) for the surgeon-spe-
cific rates in 1989 and 1990 was a very low .11. This means that using
a surgeon's 1989 risk-adjusted rate to predict the 1990 rate was only
slightly better than pure chance. The correlation coefficient for only
those surgeons with annual case volumes of 50 or more improves to a
modest .27, still too low to be confident in the predictive power of the
model applied to surgeon performance. '
One can only speculate as to whether the Newsday court's
balancing of the public's interest against the privacy rights of
physicians would have turned out differently if the court had
considered the serious flaws in the data. If the public's interest
in the data stems from their usefulness in evaluating providers,
then the serious limitations of the data's validity would certainly
diminish this interest and should have been taken into account.
VIII. INFORMING THE COURT: THE NEED FOR EVALUATION OF
OUTCOME STATISTICS
Where provider-specific outcome data could become part of
litigation in either malpractice or informed consent cases, it is
important that courts be fully aware of the limitations of these
data.68 Otherwise, the mere fact that the data have been dissem-
inated may lead courts to conclude that physicians have a duty
to disclose them to patients. The duty to disclose information
about risks associated with medical interventions cannot be in-
0" Inter-office Memorandum from Peter Slocum, Dir. of PubL Affairs, N.Y. State
Dep't of Health, to Patricia Montone 4 (Dec. 12, 1991) (on file with author).
" William J. Curran, The Acceptance of Scientific Euidence in the Courts, 309
NEw ENG. J. Mian. 713 (1983).
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dependent of the scientific basis on which that information rests.
Where scientific evidence is strong, the duty to disclose a risk
must be greater than in instances where there is little credible
basis for a risk.
At a minimum, users of the data should have access to in-
formation on the validity and reliability of provider compari-
sons. The "goodness-of-fit" of the mathematical models used to
control for patient risk factors should be disclosed along with
the publication of the mortality rates. As noted above, mortality
prediction systems are often assessed in terms of R2 statistics
that allow for quantitative comparisons. 9 Another useful statis-
tic for evaluating the model would be the predicted mortality
rate for patients who died. If the model fits the data well, most
predicted deaths should come from this group.
Finally, when deciding questions related to disclosure of
such data-whether public disclosure under freedom of informa-
tion laws or disclosure by physicians to their patients-courts
should be briefed on the intrinsic limitations of outcome com-
parisons derived from observational databases. In particular,
doubts must exist when hospitals and surgeons are compared us-
ing the experience of patients who are not randomized. Many
factors that influence patients to select a particular surgeon cre-
ate enormous potential for misleading outcome comparisons
across surgeons, such as cardiologists' referrals and surgeons'
reputations. Statistical adjustment alone cannot overcome the
fact that hospitals or surgeons who take on tough cases tend to
look bad in a mortality report.
To decide whether the release of comparative outcome sta-
tistics that are only partially adjusted for severity of illness is in
the public interest, courts should consider the potential for un-
wanted repercussions with the publication of such rankings. For
example, a recent Newsday article reported that "[s]everely ill
heart patients are finding it increasingly difficult to get surgery,
many doctors say, because some surgeons and hospitals are re-
fusing to take patients they fear will lower their standing in
state mortality statistics."70 Interviews with cardiologists and
cardiac surgeons revealed that physicians in New York State "do
not believe the system gives enough credit for operations on the
" See Hannan, supra note 7.
"' Zinman, supra note 12.
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sickest patients."71
The perception that the severity of illness adjustment is in-
adequate may have been reinforced when the hospital-specific
mortality rates were released. Many in the medical profession
noticed that the top ranked hospital in 1990 had been number
24 of 30 in 1989. One explanation offered was this hospital's de-
cision "not to do as many tougher cases" after seeing the 1989
data." This explanation casts further doubt on the study's va-
lidity; if the data were adequately adjusted for patients' severity
of illness, then selecting easier cases would not improve a hospi-
tal's rank.
C.J. McDonald and Sin L. Hui have wisely observed that:
Regardless of how they are developed, policy makers should be
slow to use 'performance' measures to reward or punish for two rea-
sons. The first is Byar's argument about using databases to compare
treatments. The hospital and physician are in some sense a treatment,
and the selection of hospital/physician is confounded by the patient's
condition-especially when we consider the patient referral process.
The second is a principle from Deming's continuous quality improve-
ment plan. Measures of performance should be used only to improve
the system. All such measures have defects. If used for reward or pun-
ishment, they divert worker energy from improving the system to crit-
icizing, or gaming, the performance measures.W 3
CONCLUSION
Any trend toward the introduction of provider-specific out-
come statistics as evidence in informed consent or malpractice
litigation can only be expected to increase defensive behavior on
the part of physicians and hospitals. While research into varia-
tions in the effectiveness of care should continue, premature
utilization of the early products of such research has considera-
ble potential to misinform consumers and demoralize health care
providers.
71 Id.
7 Altman, supra note 60.
73 Clement J. McDonald & Sin L Hui, The Analysis of Humongous Databases, 10
STAT. m11 MED. 511, 514 (1991) (emphasis in original).
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